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Reimposable Discounts and Medieval
Contract Penalties
By James P. George*
[T]he suspicious word "penalty" will be avoided by the
scrivener; the obligation will be for "lawful money" and the
condition for the payment of a "just sum" or "full sum," as
local practice dictate;
-from The Young Clerk's Guide (1670) 1
I. The Reimposable Discount
Penalty damages in contract-contrary to Anglo-American
law since the late Middle Ages-ironically are common as reimposed
discounts in modem consumer contracts. The reimposable discount
is a late-twentieth-century sales scheme that combines legal puffery
with illegal penalties. These pitches are used to sell furniture,
appliances, cell phones, cars, to rent apartments, and to promote
elective eye surgery. The offers are tempting and often heavily
marketed in the media.
The common premise is that if the buyer acts now, the seller
will discount the good or service by reducing the price, or by
postponing the first payment and waiving interest payments during
" Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. Thanks for
excellent research assistance to law students Melynda and Steven Lombardo,
Sharesa Alexander, Steven Chen, Angela Doskocil, Jodi Klockenga, and Adrienne
Wyatt; to my colleagues Kelly Ayala, Michael Green, Stephanie Marshall, Tanya
Pierce and Anna Teller for their research and commentary; to Richard Alderman,
Fred Fuchs, Lonny Hoffman, Stephen Huber, and Avery Katz for their special
expertise; and to friends and colleagues who shared and even documented their
contract penalty experiences. Their help does not imply their agreement with the
points made here.
1 See William H. Loyd, Penalties and Forfeitures Before Peachy v. The Duke
of Somerset, 29 HARV. L. REV. 117, 121-22 (1915).
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that period. Reimposable discounts mimic true discounts with these
enticements. If the buyer breaches-either a fundamental breach or
in some cases a minor breach, such as late payment-then the
discount is reimposed as stipulated damages, or sometimes as an
alternative purchase price.
In general, consumer penalties seldom are challenged and
rarely litigated. This leads to two significant negative impacts: one
suffered by the public in general, and the other by the unfortunate
breaching buyer. The first negative impact is illustrated by
Congress's recent move to make bankruptcy more difficult to
obtain-the so-called Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005.2 Whatever the validity of Congress' view
that consumers should be held more responsible for their debts, it is
obvious that additional penalties unrelated to sellers' losses are
unfair. What is worse, these penalties unnecessarily compound
consumer debt and multiply insolvencies.
The second impact, however, is more subtle. Contract
penalties have returned to common use at the same moment that tort
penalties are in retreat-under attack from both legislatures and
courts. 3 At first glance these seem to be offsetting trends, but the
opposite is true. Consumers injured by faulty products or
incompetent service providers have fewer remedies. Meanwhile,
consumers in breach of contracts increasingly are faced with
substantial penalties. These penalties hide under the guise of
reimposed discounts, or contractually-stipulated damages.
This is not to condemn true liquidated damages. Reasonable
stipulations as to actual losses are both legal and economically
efficient--even in pre-printed form contracts that are entered without
negotiation. In addition to their widespread legal acceptance,
liquidated damage clauses advance important social policies by
providing fuller remedies for sellers and service providers. When
2 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
3 See, e.g., Texans for Lawsuit Reform, http://www.tortreform.com (last
visited Oct. 2, 2007); See also, George C. Freeman, Jr. & Makram B. Jaber,
Further Progress in Defining Constitutional Constraints on Punitive Damages and
Other Monetary Punishments, 61 Bus. LAW. 517 (2006) (discussing judicial
restrictions under constitutional clauses), and Arthur H. Bryant, Access to Justice at
Risk, NAT'L L.J. March 28, 2005, at 22 (for examples of existing and proposed
federal legislative restrictions on state tort remedies). See generally James P.
George, Access to Justice, Costs, and Legal Aid, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 293 (2006).
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litigation is necessary, moreover, they tend to reduce trial costs by
sidestepping proof of quantified damages.
What is not legitimate, however, is the stipulation of money
damages not directed to any contractual loss--direct, indirect,
consequential, administrative, or otherwise. The law has not changed
in this area in more than four hundred years. In spite of this,
unlitigated penalties are now pervasive in consumer transactions.
After recounting the ancient and ample precedents barring
contract penalties, this article focuses on two examples of
contemporary contract penalties with slightly differing sales pitches:
new car sales and apartment rentals. Both examples demonstrate that
these penalties run afoul of pervasive common law and statutory
rules, as well as contemporary economic arguments favoring
stipulated damages. The article concludes with a short discussion of
why these issues are not being litigated.
II. The Contract Penalty in Anglo-American Law
Contract penalties, and specifically their illegality in the
Anglo-American legal system, have a long and fascinating pedigree.
History, of course, becomes irrelevant if the law has significantly
evolved or been entirely rejected. The ban on penalties has not. It is
one of the oldest rules in Anglo-American law. The underlying
policy reasons remain the same. Indeed, the rule's age and durability
are ironic in light of the current consumer market's growing
disregard. The discussion begins with a general sketch of early
contract law, the Roman stipulatio, and the medieval English contract
under seal. It concludes with a discussion of the bar in contemporary
contract law. The rule's fashioners include Lord Mansfield, Sir
Thomas Moore, Justice Story and Judge Posner, with social
commentary from William Shakespeare.
A. Antiquity, Rome, and England
Legal history suggests an inverse relationship between the use
of contract penalties and the progress of social and legal systems: the
growth of legal systems is the decline of penalties. The nature of
contract law before the ascendancy of the Roman Empire is unclear,
but scant evidence suggests that penalties were the exclusive contract
remedy. The likely beginning of legal involvement in contract
disputes was the advent of the executory contract, that is, the contract
based on an agreement involving future performance by one or both
[Vol. 20:1
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parties.4 In non-executory contracts-those completed on the spot-
remedies were needed only for non-conforming goods, and history
offers little evidence of legal resolutions for these disputes.5 These
earliest executory contracts were based entirely on formalities. If the
contract was in the proper form, often dictated by religion, it was
enforceable and the only concern was compelling performance. This
was done at first by religious sanctions, some as severe as
excommunication. These eventually gave way to governmental
sanctions. The simplest were fines and the most severe were the
withdrawal of the law's protection. Another source of sanctions:
those enforced by guilds and voluntary associations such as those
formed by merchants. These penalties often outweighed the
promisee's actual loss, but had the advantage of promoting peaceful
settlements.
6
The influence of these pre-Roman legal systems is unclear,
but whatever Rome may have drawn from them, the penalties
continued. Increasing trade in the growing Roman Empire resulted in
more use of executory agreements, where a party offered
consideration in exchange for the later delivery of goods. Lenders
4 See generally 1 WILLIAM HERBERT PAGE, PAGE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
3-5 (2d ed. 1920). American contracts treatises tend to begin with the Roman
Empire and ignore prior systems. Professor Page briefly addresses pre-Roman
systems but cites only two sources. Id. at 4. Discussing contracts' legal evolution,
Page describes the two executory contracts that we recognize today-the fully
executory contract based on a formal promise with performance yet to come from
both sides, and the partially executory contract where performance has been
rendered by one side, creating an obligation for the other side. Id. The significance
in Page's distinction is that the fully executory contract, that is, a promise with no
performance from either side, drew its obligation from a religious base rather than
what we would recognize as legal obligation; and, furthermore, it had religious
sanctions as remedies. Id. See also 1 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON
CONTRACTS § 1.4, at 11-13 (3d ed 2004). Sir Henry Maine's well-known treatise
offers little more on pre-Roman contracts than speculation that prior to the Roman
Empire, various jurisdictions' laws of contract were merely rudimentary attempts to
resolve disputes among equals because inequals could not have mutually-
enforceable agreements. See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 312-14
(Transaction Publishers, 2002) (1866). These accounts of pre-Roman contract law
are further supported in non-legal historical references. See e.g., Contracts, 15
ENCYC. BRITANNICA 340-41 (2003).
5 See PAGE, supra note 4, at 2-3 (contrasting the relatively sophisticated
purpose of the modem legal system in rendering justice with the primitive legal
system's goal of maintaining peace and avoiding violent remedies that occur
outside a legal system).
6 Id. at 3-5.
2007]
Loyola Consumer Law Review
often financed these trade ventures, leading to the use of penalties for
late payments. The perceived severity of those penalties led in turn
to the development of usury laws, and with lawyers' help, the
circumvention of usury laws by creative drafting and alternative
penalties.'
Penal clauses, which became popular to ensure performance
for a variety of acts and forbearance, were used in more than credit
transactions. They took the form that we might recognize as bonds,
and in fact were later termed "penal bonds" in England.8
Roman law developed three forms of contracts, with penalties
most commonly associated with the stipulation contract.9 Stipulatio
was a written agreement to pay a fixed sum. In performing the
relevant act, however, the agreement released the promisor from the
obligation. The amount of stipulated money had no limit other than
the will of the parties. Roman courts would enforce it in full, even
where it exceeded the value of the act or forbearance.' 0 Even the
Romans later saw the need to modify this practice and limit the award
to actual damages, at least in some cases." Often the agreement
required the obligor to perform by a certain date. In some instances,
such as with agreements for the use of land, the parties simply
attached the time element to the term of the lease.' For lending
transactions, stipulatio circumvented the usury ban by requiring a
penalty if the money were not repaid by a fixed date. It was often no
7 "The rapid spread of this form of obligation is explained by the fact that it
was well adapted to evade the canonical prohibition of interest on loans, regarded
as usury and therefore unlawful for a Christian, and that by the time interest was
made lawful it had become firmly established as a common form of conveyancing."
Loyd, supra note 1, at 119.
8 See 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 12.18 at 302-03; Loyd, supra note 1, at
119, 122.
9 The other two forms of contract were "real" and "consensual." Real
contracts were partly executed and the promisor's obligation arose not from the
promise but the prior performance by the promisee. Consensual contracts were
purely executory and thus based on the parties' exchange of promises. Both real
and consensual contracts lacked the formalities of the stipulatio. See 1
FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 1.4, at 11-13.
1o See Loyd, supra note 1, at 117 n.2 (citing JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES, 3, 15, 7
(Moyle's 5th ed.); Dig. 4, 8, 32; 21, 2, 56).
" Id. at 117-18 n.3 (citing HUNTER, ROMAN LAW, 652, citing Dig. 44, 4, 4, 3).
12 See 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 12.18 at 302. It is unclear at what stage
the use of sureties became common, and stipulatio was also apparently used to bind
the third party surety in addition to or instead of the obligor. Id.
[Vol. 20:1
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defense that the debtor was detained in his journey to the creditor's
home or otherwise paid a few days late. As with the earlier practice,
the penalty was often strictly enforced.1
3
England, or Britannia during Roman times, was situated on
the western edge of the pre-Columbian world and was primitive.'
4
The Roman law of contracts faded in England when the empire
failed, and England's primitive legal system developed these
concepts anew. Writings rarely evidenced executory contracts
before the end of the thirteenth century. Most instances of enforcing
agreements related to obligations to the king or other governmental
figures.
With these exceptions, no writings guaranteed later
performance or forbearance between private parties.' 6 One reason
may be the relative absence of purely private transactions in feudal
kingdoms. In any event, the king's courts had the role of developing
English contract law and were not inclined to adjudicate purely
private agreements. 7
To the extent that private parties entered unwritten executory
agreements (or written agreements out of form), at least three sources
made available remedies outside the king's judicial system:
ecclesiastical courts applying canon law, commercial courts applying
law merchant, and eventually equity courts. The remedies there, as
with earlier primitive systems, included penalties to induce
performance rather than damages for breach.' 8
13 See Loyd, supra note 1, at 119 nn.8-12. For civil law jurisdictions in Europe,
the Roman practice has continued into the twentieth century, allowing for
contractual penalties but with some jurisdictions authorizing the courts to modify
the penalty if disproportionately high. Id. at 118 nn.3-7.
14 See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, §1.5 at 13.
"5 See id.
16 Up to the late 1200s, court-enforced penalties typically involved agreements
under which a penalty was to be paid to the king, the sheriff, or to Westminster
Abbey "for the relief of the Holy Land." See Loyd, supra note 1, at 119 n.9 (citing
2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, 224; John of Oxford's form book, 7 LAW QUART. REV.
65, displaying a penal bond from the year 1274).
17 "[I]t is not the custom of the court of the lord king to protect private
agreements, nor does it even concern itself with such contracts as can be considered
to be like private agreements." 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, §1.5 at 14 (quoting
R. DE GLANVILLE, TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF
ENGLAND, bk. 10, ch. 18 (G. Hall ed. 1965)).
18 See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 1.5 at 13-17. As with earlier legal
2007]
Loyola Consumer Law Review
Two developments eventually brought change. One was
England's increased trade with other Europeans. Trade necessarily
involved executory agreements, and often required financing which
came from European lenders who insisted on penalties for late
payment. 19 The second development was the increased use of wax
seals in a practice based on the Roman stipulatio. The wax seal is an
ancient means of validation, essential in the days when illiteracy was
high. Seals were common in Roman law, but England had been slow
to adapt.
At the time of the Norman Conquest, only the highest English
nobles and royalty possessed seals.2 0 They used seals to signify not
only the noble's declarations, but also obligations that we would now
consider private. They used them for royal decrees and simple
correspondence where the seal's function included both sealing the
21
envelope and authenticating the source. Seals thus provided
widely-accepted proof of consent and authenticity and were
ultimately adopted by a wider audience.
The increasing popularity of wax-sealed agreements resulted
in better evidence, and allowed courts to enforce onerous remedies
with greater confidence. As the adjudication of private agreements
increased, the remedies for breach were bound up in the common law
systems (see supra notes 4-13 and accompanying text), canon law enforced
contracts through religious sanctions including excommunication. See id.
19 See Loyd, supra note 1, at 119. See also 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK &
FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW: BEFORE THE TIME
OF EDWARD I 225-26 (2d ed. 1959). This conclusion is best illustrated with the
point that, in that pre-Columbian times, Venice was the center of European trade
while relatively primitive England lay on the western edge of that world.
20 The English use of seals contrasted from that in other kingdoms at that time.
"In the France of Bracton's day the privilege of using a seal was confined to
'gentixhomes'; a man of lower degree would execute his bond by carrying it before
his lord and procuring the apposition of his lord's seal. [footnote omitted] But in
England, as we have often seen, the law for the great became the law for all, and
before the end of the thirteenth century the free and lawful man usually had a seal."
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 19, at 223-24. In spite of England's slow
acceptance of seals for routine transactions, seals were essential for public records
prior to the Norman Conquest. Id. at 223.
21 See History-Sigillography, 20 ENCYC. BRITANNICA 611-13 (2003);
Contracts, 15 ENCYC. BRITANNICA 341, 343 (2003). For online reference, see
Seals, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (2006), http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9066471.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 96 cmt. a (1981); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1376 (8th ed. 2004). See generally SIR HILARY JENKINSON, GUIDE TO
SEALS IN THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE (London, Her Majesty's Stationary Office,
1954).
[Vol. 20:1
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forms of action. The penal remedy was linked in particular to the
action of covenant, which by the mid-fourteenth century required a
wax-sealed instrument.
22
Penalties became especially popular for easements, rights of
pasturage, and feudal tithes. In many cases, penalties were connected
to borrowed money or other instances of credit and, accordingly, ran
into the developing concepts of usury. 23 But penalties in non-lending
agreements did not encounter the usury bar and their practice became
common.
24
The use of sealed agreements in England eventually acquired
enormous significance. By the fourteenth century, a contract under
seal could be enforced on its face with no showing of the elements of
contract or the presence of consideration. 25 The result in some cases:
the automatic enforcement of penalties verbatim, even for the
slightest noncompliance with the terms of contract.26 Unfair results
led to negative judicial reaction and reform. England's reaction to
large and powerful European banks may also have contributed.
Negative reaction occurred outside the legal system as well, best
highlighted by Shakespeare's social comment with the pound of flesh
demanded in The Merchant of Venice.27
22 See I FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 1.5 at 15-16.
23 Loyd, supra note 1, at 119-21.
24 The English penal bond was a sealed instrument with a promise to pay a
stated sum, further providing that this promise was null and void if the promisor
rendered the required performance. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 12.18 at 302.
Farnsworth notes that this is similar to the still-used third party surety. It differs,
however, in the amount obligated. Common law courts enforced penal bonds
strictly and literally according to Farnsworth. If, then, the promisor did not meet
every obligation under the contract, the common law courts would render judgment
on the penal bond, regardless of the amount of loss suffered by the promisee. This
had the effect of securing contract performance by making breach entirely
unacceptable because of the resulting high penalty, a so-called in terrorem effect.
Id. at 301.
25 THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
633-34 (5th ed. 1956). Consideration was unknown at the time and did not set in
until Slade's Case in 1602. Id. at 645-51.
26 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 12.18 at 302.
27 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 1, sc. 3 (cited
in POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 19, at 225). See also Loyd, supra note 1, at
123 (observing that The Merchant of Venice "clearly indicates that the medieval
mind was already, perhaps unconsciously, in revolt against the harshness, the
excessive literalism of the law, of which the merchant's bond was but a symbol").
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Doctrinal relief from penalties-their outright proscription-
did not arrive until the equity courts began issuing injunctions in the
sixteenth century. Anecdotal relief came centuries earlier from both
law and equity judges who began denying penalty clauses as early as
1308. In Umfraville v. Lonstede, plaintiff brought an action in debt
based on a writing that was supposed to have been delivered on a
certain day.28 The defendant pleaded that he had been away from
home but had left the task to an agent, that he had subsequently
offered to deliver the writing, that plaintiff had suffered no damage
by the short delay, and that defendant was again tendering
performance as part of his answer. When Plaintiff rejected the
defense and the tender, Lord Chief Justice Bereford responded:
You demand this debt because the writing was not
delivered and he says that before now he has tendered it,
and that he tenders it now. Therefore it is well that you
receive it. Moreover, this is not, properly speaking, a debt;
it is a penalty, and with what equity.., can you demand
this penalty? 9
Bereford's twelfth-century reasoning remains one of the
rationales for rejecting contract penalties. The plaintiff may have
profited more from the breach than from performance, thus
motivating plaintiff to reject performance on any grounds, or in some
cases to create circumstances favoring a breach.3°
See also Richard A. Posner, Remarks on Law and Literature, 23 LoY. U. CHI. L.J.
181, 183-85 (1991-92).
28 Loyd, supra note 1, at 119 (citing to Y.B. 2 & 3 Edw. 2, reprinted in
SELDEN SOCIETY 58). See also PLUCKNETT, supra note 25, at 677 (citing Y.B.
Edw. 2, reprinted in 2 SELDEN SOCIETY xiii, 59). Bereford, a common law judge,
was apparently using the term "equity" in a general sense, and not jurisdictionally.
29 Loyd, supra note 1, at 119 (citing Y.B. 2 & 3 Edw. 2, reprinted in SELDEN
SOCIETY 58). Bereford was a law judge, sitting eventually as Lord Chief Justice on
the Queen's Bench. His use of the term "equity" is apparently generic rather than
jurisdictional. This passage is alternatively reported as, "What equity would it be
to award you the debt when the document is tendered and when you cannot show
that you have been damaged by the detention .... Moreover this is not properly a
debt but a penalty; and with what equity can you demand this penalty?"
PLUCKNETT, supra note 25, at 677 (citing Y.B. Edw. 2, reprinted in 2 SELDEN
SOCIETY xiii, 59).
30 See generally Loyd, supra note 1, at 120-25. See also PLUNKNETT, supra
note 25, at 677-78.
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For several hundred years, then, the negative reaction to penal
bonds from both law and equity was merely case-specific, and
penalties remained in use. The task fell to the chancery courts to
fashion the doctrines that ultimately barred the penal bonds and
contract penalties in general.
The first categorical relief came at the beginning of the
seventeenth century, in cases where the obligor had incurred the
penalty through his own negligent or unintentional acts, and where
the harm to the obligee was minor.31 Sir Thomas Moore urged the
next step, which interestingly enough involved claims for
nonpayment of rent. The procedure allowed the defaulting tenant to
seek relief from chancery, which would enjoin the landlord from
enforcing the penalty and require him to take the claim back to law
courts to determine actual damages. 32  The equitable remedies
became common enough to compel their direct application in the law
courts, accomplished both by changes in the common law and by
statute.
33
By the late seventeenth century, the English legal community
had determined that society would be better served if contract breach
was an available option, as long as the breaching party was prepared
to pay the other's loss. Equity courts were the forum, and they began
enjoining penal bonds, then sending the case to trial in common law
courts to determine the actual damages. This in turn led to statutes in
England requiring the penal bond obligee to state the promisor's
breach and then show actual damages. 34 The ractice later extended
to a general bar of penal damages in contract. These statutes came
late enough and were sufficiently permanent that they applied to the
American colonies, and were succeeded by new statutes after
American independence.
36
31 Loyd, supra note 1, at 124-25, and sources cited therein.
32 Certainly by the time of the Restoration it could be said that, "[i]t is a
common case to give relief against the penalty of such bonds to perform covenants,
etc, and to send it to a trial at law to ascertain the damages in a quantum
damnificatus." Loyd, supra note 1, at 125 (quoting from 1 EQUITY CASES 91
(abr.)). See also 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 12.18 at 302.
33 Loyd, supra note 1, at 126. See also PLUNKNETT, supra note 25, at 608.
34 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 12.18 at 302.
35 Id.
36 Loyd, supra note 1, at 126 (citing S.D. Wilson, Courts of Chancery in the
American Colonies, 19 AM. L. REv. 226). See also 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 4,
2007]
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B. The American View
The American colonies adopted English law piecemeal, and
initiated several areas of reform. One reform promoted freedom of
contract, encouraging the evolution of contracts with stipulated
damages. Some met the definition of penalties, but even where the
colonial courts enforced them, a rule of reason prevailed.
One example is Tall v. Ryland, a 1670 colonial opinion based
on Tall's equitable action to enjoin a law verdict requiring him to
forfeit a £ 20 bond.37 Tall and Ryland were fishmongers with
contiguous shops, and Tall had executed the bond as assurance that
38he would not disparage Ryland's fish. Tall fell short of his pledge
when he asked a customer why he would buy fish from Ryland
because Ryland's fish stunk.3 9 Ryland sued on the bond and won.4 °
Following the English procedure, Tall brought the equitable action to
enjoin the penalty, but the chancery judge sustained Ryland's
demurrer. The equity court held that the bond related to an
agreement "to preserve amity and neighborly friendship" and that
42Ryland had sustained damage for which £ 20 was a fair estimate. In
finding for Ryland, however, the judge noted that this was "not to be
a precedent in the case of a bond of £ 100 or the like. 43
In assessing this case's meaning, it is noteworthy that today
Ryland would have a tort remedy for defamation or business
disparagement, apart from the bond remedy. Because Tall and
Ryland had already agreed on the bond and its terms, it is easy to
understand why a court might find it enforceable. Assuming that this
modem remedy was contemplated in a contract between the parties,
the liquidated damages clause for £ 20 would likely be upheld today
as a reasonable assessment of unquantifiable damages. Consistent
with the law of today, the 1670 equity court stated in dicta that an
at 302.
37 Loyd, supra note 1, at 128 (citing and quoting I CASES IN CHANCERY 183
(1670), 1 EQUITY CASES 91 (abr.)).
38 id.
39 Id.
40 id.
41 Id.
42 Loyd, supra note 1, at 128 (citing 1 CASES IN CHANCERY 183 (1670), 1
EQUITY CASES 91 (abr.)).
43 Id.
[Vol. 20:1
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unreasonably high bond would not be enforced.4 The unstated rule
is that liquidated damages that are unreasonably high amount to a
penalty.
American law, both common law and statutory, has largely
followed the English ban on contract penalties. In his seminal work
Equity Jurisprudence, Joseph Story disputed views that questioned
the courts' ability to interfere with stipulated damages: "There is no
more intrinsic sanctity in stipulations by contract than in other solemn
acts of the parties which are constantly interfered with by courts of
equity upon the broad grounds of public policy on the pure principles
of natural justice. '" 6 A century and a half later, Professor Farnsworth
traced the American view from a three-element test for improper
stipulated damaiges to a single principle of just compensation for
actual damages. American law reflects this conclusion in scores of
cases and articles,48 and the Supreme Court has recognized its
application to federal government claims against private
contractors.
The most thorough explanation may belong to Judge Posner,
writing as judge, but with his usual scholarly insight. Lake River
Corp. v. Carborundum Co. 50 was a dispute in which a warehouse
operator sought recovery of contractually-agreed damages for a
manufacturer's breach of a distribution agreement. The product was
44 id.
45 Loyd, supra note 1, at 129 n.50 (citing several cases on this point from 1674
through 1891).
46 Id. at 126 (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1316 (13th
ed. 1886)).
47 The original three elements justifying liquidated damages were that (1) the
damages must be uncertain or difficult to prove; (2) the parties must intend to
liquidate them in advance; and (3) the stipulated amount must be reasonable. 3
FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 12.18 at 305 (discussing Banta v. Stanford Motor
Co., 92 A. 665 (Conn. 1914)). Farnsworth explains that an increased emphasis on
contracting freedom and the development of the doctrine of unconscionability led
to the de-emphasis of the first two elements, leaving the lone element of just
compensation. See id.
48 E.g., Sun Ridge Investors, Ltd. v. Parker, 956 P.2d 876 (Okla. 1998); Flores
v. Millenium Interests, Ltd., 185 S.W.3d 427 (Tex. 2005); Raffel v. Medallion
Kitchens of Minn., Inc., 1996 WL 675787 (N.D. Ill. 1996). See generally 3
FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 12.18 at 300-23.
49 See Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947).
so Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985).
2007]
Loyola Consumer Law Review
"Ferro Carbo," an abrasive powder used in steel production. To
better serve its midwestern customers, manufacturer Carborundum
asked that Lake River, operator of an Illinois warehouse, serve as
distributor. In the resulting contract, Lake River was to receive Ferro
Carbo in bulk, package it in bags, and ship the bags to
Carborundum's customers. Carborundum would retain title until
delivery to the customer. To package the Ferro Carbo, Lake River
had to install a new bagging system at a cost of $89,000. To ensure
recovery of this cost and the agreed-to profit of twenty percent, Lake
River negotiated a minimum-quantity guarantee of 22,500 tons over a
three-year period. That clause further stated that if the minimum
quantity was not shipped at the end of the three-year term, that Lake
River had the right to invoice Carborundum for the difference
between the quantity bagged and the minimum guaranteed.5'
The parties signed the contract in 1979, but the price of steel
soon dropped and when the contract expired in 1982, Carborundum
had shipped only 12,000 of the promised 22,500 tons. Had the
contract been performed in full, Lake River would have profited
approximately $553,000, and when the contract ended, it demanded
the anticipated balance of $ 241,000. Carborundum refused, arguing
that this was not liquidated damages, but instead an unenforceable
penalty. Making the case more litigable, Lake River still had 500
tons of Ferro Carbo with a market value of $269,000, and it refused
release until Carborundum paid the contractually-agreed damages.
Lake River offered to sell the Ferro Carbo and place the funds in
escrow, but Carborundum rejected that and instead trucked in its
product for those customers, at an additional cost of $31,000. Lake
River sued in federal court for $ 241,000, and Carborundum
counterclaimed for conversion. The trial court found in both parties'
favor, that is, that Lake River was entitled to the contract damages of
$241,000 plus $17,000 in prejudgment interest, but that Lake River in
turn had wrongfully converted the inventory and owed Carborundum
$269,000 plus $31,000 for the extra cost of shipping. Both parties
appealed.5
Noting that Lake River had not been able to identify the type
of lien it was asserting, Judge Posner likened it to an artisan's or
bailee's lien, that is, one imposed on goods on which services had
been rendered without payment. The court then held such a lien to be
inappropriate under these facts because Carborundum had paid for all
5'Id. at 1286.
52Id at 1286-87.
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services up to that point. Its only breach had been the failure to ship
the additional quantity to Ferro Carbo, to achieve the guaranteed
minimum. Thus Lake River was holding the Ferro Carbo, not for
payment of an existing debt, but, to pressure Carborundum into
paying the liquidated damages on the Ferro Carbo that had not been
shipped. In turn, Lake River had not incurred expenses in bagging or
delivering the unshipped Ferro Carbo, a point that led to the court's
conclusion that Lake River was pursuing a penalty. 3
Turning to the damages issue, Judge Posner acknowledged an
inclination to question whether the historic ban on penalty clauses
was appropriate. This dicta produced two arguable policy reasons for
upholding contractual penalties. First, parties agreeing to penalties
for breach are providing an earnest of performance. The willingness
to suffer a penalty that clearly exceeds actual damages enhances the
promisor's credibility and may enable the promisor to enter contracts
otherwise closed.5 4  Second, penalty clauses may discourage both
efficient and inefficient breaches. An efficient breach is one done
purposefully in order to maximize the breaching party's gain because
of conditions arising after the contract's creation.
Judge Posner used the example of a breach that will cost the
breaching party $12,000 in payment to the other party, but will earn
the breaching party $20,000 elsewhere. Even though efficient
breaches are good in a macro-economic sense because they produce a
net gain, they can be nuisances to some contracting parties. Penalty
clauses that nullify the breaching party's gain help ensure specific
performance without resorting to courts.55
Judge Posner explained the utility of penalty clauses by
distinguishing efficient breaches from inefficient ones, with the latter
defined as breaches costing the promisee more than the gain to the
breaching promisor. Posner concluded that because compensatory
damages are sufficient for inefficient breaches, the social utility of
53 Lake River, 769 F.2d. at 1287-88. The court further rejected Lake River's
argument that contrary to the court's analysis, it had sustained actual damages in its
purchase of the bagging equipment which now would have to be amortized over the
sale of 12,500 rather than 22,5000 tons of Ferro Carbo. The court found that not
only did Lake River use the bagging equipment for other jobs, but that amortization
was a mere accounting entry and need not reflect cash flows. In so holding, the
court was not rejecting Lake River's claiming of that $89,000 cost of the bagging
equipment, but merely holding that Lake River would have to prove such damages
conventionally. Id. at 1288.
14 Id. at 1289.
55 Id.
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penalty clauses is limited to the deterrent effect on efficient breaches.
Exceptions and counter-arguments exist here as well. One is that
penalty clauses are justifiable because for all contracts, they enhance
the promisor's credibility and thereby create access to otherwise
unavailable contracts. A final Posner dictum-important to this
article's point-is that
[p]arties (always assuming they are fully competent) will,
in deciding whether to include a penalty clause in their
contract, weigh the gains against the costs--costs that
include the possibility of discouraging an efficient breach
somewhere down the road-and will include the clause
only if the benefits exceed those costs as well as all other
costs.
56
Having made the argument for penalty clauses in some
economic settings, Judge Posner then acknowledged that this
economic view is not the law, not in Illinois and not in the US.
57
Under Lake River's legal summary, liquidated damages must be
[a] reasonable estimate at the time of contracting of the
likely damages from breach, and the need for estimation at
that time must be shown by reference to the likely difficulty
of measuring the actual damages from a breach of contract
after the breach occurs. If damages would be easy to
determine then, or if the estimate greatly exceeds a
reasonable upper estimate of what the damage are likely to
be, it is a penalty.58
Applying the rule to the Lake River facts, Judge Posner
acknowledged that the penalty/liquidated damages distinction is often
difficult and rests on facts peculiar to each case. For Lake River's
contract, however, the clause clearly was a penalty because it was
56 Id.
57 "[W]e must be on guard to avoid importing our own ideas of sound public
policy into an area where our proper judicial role is more than usually deferential.
The responsibility for making innovations in the common law of Illinois rests with
the courts of Illinois, and not with the federal courts in Illinois. And like every
other state, Illinois, untroubled by academic skepticism on the wisdom of refusing
to enforce penalty clauses against sophisticated promisors .... continues steadfastly
to insist on the distinction between penalties and liquidated damages." Lake River,
769 F.2d. at 1289 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
58 Id. (citing Illinois case law).
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"designed always to assure Lake River more than its actual
damages, '59 a conclusion supported by a series of hypotheticals
demonstrating Lake River's loss at various times in the term of the
contract. The clause failed to calculate that Lake River would gain
by not having to incur its own performance costs, and instead
guaranteed it a profit.
In reaching this conclusion, Posner carefully distinguished
valid liquidated damages, using a case law example of an
employment agreement that docked the employee four percent of his
salary for early resignation, and did so in addition to the employee's
loss of the remaining months' salary. This was a valid estimate of the
damage to the employer in finding a replacement, Posner argued,
even though the four percent measure will increase with higher-paid
employees.
Lake River performs multiple functions in American
jurisprudence. It explores the policy arguments for contracted-for
penalties in limited settings, typically involving parties of equal
bargaining power who are negotiating agreements in which
guarantees or other features are especially important. It
acknowledges that in spite of significant scholarly support for these
arguments, American law has uniformly retained the English ban on
contract penalties that cannot meet the test for liquidated damages. It
articulates the liquidated damages test and provides a nuanced
distinction between legal liquidated damages and illegal penalties
posing as liquidated damages. But assuming full merit for Judge
Posner's arguments for the utility of penalty clauses, those arguments
do not support their enforcement in adhesion consumer contracts
consummated with little or no negotiation between parties of
significantly disparate bargaining power.60
9 Id. at 1290.
60 For a convenient summary of the scholarly analyses of contract penalties,
see Avery W. Katz, Remedies for Breach of Contract Under the CISG, 25 INT'L
REv. L. & ECON. 378, 386-87 (2005). Professor Katz's discussion cites to articles
for and against "supracompensatory damages" in both domestic and international
commercial settings, with little if any application to consumer sales. These articles
include Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the
Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes of an Enforcement Model and a Theory
of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 544 (1977); Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Efficiency
Implications of Penalties and Liquidated Damages, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 147 (1984);
Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as Barriers to Entry, 77 AM. ECON.
REv. 388 (1987); Tai-Yeong Chung, On the Social Optimality of Liquidated
Damages Clauses: An Economic Analysis, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 280 (1992); Aaron
S. Edlin &Alan Schwartz, Optimal Penalties in Contracts, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
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To the extent that Lake River purports to examine the
American rule on contract penalties, its ruling reflects only the
common law. A complete review requires attention to statutory
oversight of contracts, and there are countless examples in the US.
Contracts have been somewhat regulated by statute since late
medieval England, including one that codified the equity courts'
requirement that contract damages be limited to the actual loss
61sustained. This raises two important corollaries regarding
consumer transactions. First, the Uniform Commercial Code's
("UCC") regulation of consumer sales echoes the common law rule
barring penalties.62 Second, some statutes impose penalties for
33 (2003); Alan Schwartz, The Myth That Promises Prefer Supracompensatory
Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for Damages Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369
(1990); Aaron S. Edlin, Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments: Efficient
Investment Under Expectation Damages, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 98 (1996); Aaron
S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard Breach, and Optimal
Investment, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 478 (1996); Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole,
Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 83
(1999); Avery W. Katz, The Option Element in Contracting, 90 VA. L. REV. 2187
(2004); Robert E. Scott and George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case
Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COLUM L. REV. 1428 (2004). See
also articles listed at 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 12.18 at 303 n.8. For an
article addressing adhesion issues in consumer contracts but not including
penalties, see Omri Ben-Shahar, "Boilerplate" Foundations of Market Contracts
Symposium, 104 MICH. L. REV. 821-1246 (2006) (generally discussing adhesion
agreements with no focused discussion of penalty damages).
61 See 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 12.18 at 302-03.
62 U.C.C. § 2-718 (2003). Section 2-718 was amended in 2003, with no
substantive change regarding consumer contracts but easing the burden of proof for
plaintiffs in commercial cases. As of the time of this publication, no states have
adopted the amended version. However, this strikeout version, taken from the
official text, reflects that the UCC's rule on liquidated damages has been consistent
with the common law and did not change with the 2003 amendments. The standard
and amended sections read:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement
but only at an amount whieh that is reasonable in the light of the
anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach and, in a consumer
contract, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or non-
feasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A-ei ..- fixinig
unreasonably large liquidated damages is vid as a penalty. Section 2-
719 determines the enforceability of a term that limits but does not
liquidate damages
Amended art. 2-718, 1 U.L.A. 549 (2004). Official Comment 2 to the 2003 version
states in part: "Under original Section 2-718, a party seeking to enforce a liquidated
damages term had to demonstrate the difficulty of proving the loss and the
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breach with the intention of punishing the breach, but the legislative
intent emphasizes that these penalties are exceptions rather than a
trend away from the rule.
63
Summarizing the law's view of contract penalties, the
measure of damages for breach of contract is what the promisee
would have received had the contract been performed. Contractually-
stipulated damages are valid to compensate for real losses that are
difficult to quantify. But stipulated damages not reasonably allocable
to actual losses, but instead aimed at encouraging performance, are
illegal.64 Economists have questioned the Anglo-American rejection
of penalties and have argued for their utility in limited contract
settings involving parties of equal bargaining power. Legislatures
and courts have rejected these arguments, but even if lawmakers
heeded the economists, their arguments are not directed to the form-
printed consumer contracts in which reimposable discounts lurk.
inconvenience or nonfeasibility of obtaining an adequate remedy. These
requirements have been eliminated in commercial contracts but are retained in
consumer contracts." In other words, the 2003 insertion of "and, in a consumer
contract" was intended to ease the burden of proof for plaintiffs in commercial
contracts who were on a more even footing with the breaching defendant, but retain
the higher burden for sellers in consumer contracts. Official Comment 3 explains
that the penultimate sentence was stricken for redundancy. See id
63 See e.g., Flores v. Millenium Interests, Ltd., 185 S.W.3d 427 (Tex. 2005)
(construing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.077 (Vernon 2006).). Two other Texas
statutes treating "liquidated damages" as a penalty provision are TEX. LAB. CODE
ANN. § 62.201 (Vernon 2006) (for violations of the minimum wage law), and TEX.
AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 52.106(d)(1) (Vernon 2004) (allowing a marketing
association to "fix as liquidated damages a specific amount to be paid by a member
if the member breaches the marketing contract"). Flores, 185 S.W.3d at 432 nn. 4-
5.
64See e.g., Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. at 412-14; Lake River,
769 F.2d at 1290; Sun Ridge Investors, 956 P.2d at 878. The general principle that
contract damages are measured by the non-breaching party's loss of expected
profits is thoroughly established in American law. See 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note
4, § 12.8 at 190 ("One is entitled to recover an amount that will put one in as good
a position as one would have been in had the contract been performed); id. at 301
("Enforcement of [a penalty] provision would allow the parties to depart from the
fundamental principle that the law's goal on breach of contract is not to deter
breach by compelling the promissor to perform, but rather to redress breach by
compensating the promissee."). Recent reaffirmations include Coghlan v.
Wellcraft Marine Corp., 240 F.3d 449, 453-54 (5th Cir. 2001) (construing Florida
and Texas law); Ex Parte Steadman, 812 So.2d 290, 295 (Ala. 2001); Siegel v.
Laric Entm't Corp., 763 N.Y.S.2d 607, 608 (N.Y. App. Div.. 2003); Ford v.
Trendwest Resorts Inc., 43 P.3d 1223, 1227-28 (Wash. 2002).
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Il. Discounts and Other Purchase Incentives as
Penalties
For as long as Anglo-American jurisprudence has opposed
contract penalties, people with the upper hand in drafting contracts
have conceived of strategems to circumvent the ban. Ample case law
reflects these attempts, mostly in commercial settings between parties
of somewhat equal bargaining strength. These penalties have most
often been disguised as liquidated damages. 65  The more clever
drafters take advantage of the penalty/liquidated damages distinction
by characterizing the damages as good faith estimates of the
promisee's actual loss, highlighting the loss and the likely inability to
ascertain that loss accurately. Courts have seen through this by
ignoring labels and treating the contractual terms for their actual
function and result.
66
With clever drafting innovations, many consumer contracts
today avoid characterizing the extra damages as penalties. Instead,
they are characterized as discounts that can be reimposed upon
breach. Such discounts appear in several forms. Among them:
deferred payments, reduced interest on the underlying financial
agreement, interest waivers, and discounts from a seller-established
"market price" or "list price."
Of course, these practices also are purchase incentives, and in
that function alone are perfectly legal even if somewhat deceptive.
67
It is the seller's reimposition of the discount upon breach that is
illegal. Sellers can make a number of arguments to support the
reimposed discounts. Two examples, however, illustrate the
invalidity of those arguments-rent concessions in residential
leasing, and new car sales with deferred payments and no interest
during the deferred period.
65 See Lake River, 769 F.2d at 1288-91. See generally 3 FARNSWORTH, supra
note 4, § 12.18 at 300-23, especially 302-05.
66 See Stewart v. Basey, 245 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex 1952).
67 All three examples--deferred payments, interest waivers, and discounts
from manufacturer's list price-are nothing more than the seller varying the
initially-offered sale price in competition with other sellers. These examples
function as real discounts only where the seller is charging less than the price for
which a commonly-transacted good is otherwise selling. If price competition is the
motive, then the lowered "discount" price is the true market value. See infra notes
72-75 and accompanying text.
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A. Discounts from "Market Price"
Discounts are no doubt as old as trade, or at least as old as
pre-set prices. They raise legal questions only where the discount is
illusory or creates deception. Discounts designed merely to induce
the sale are puffery and are legal. Reimposable discounts generally
take the rhetorical form of puffery and may seem harmless, but they
are likely to be illegal penalties. Rent discounts are a good example.
Sunset Apartments advertises special rent concessions for
tenants signing leases in the current month. The advertising does not
reveal that the special recurs in continuous monthly increments. The
pitch is that tenants can enjoy a $1,000 apartment for only $800 a
month for the twelve-month lease. Clause 5 states that tenant "will
pay $1,000 per month for rent" and further identifies that amount as
the "market rent" without defining that term. Clause 10 states that
tenant "will receive a $200 monthly discount making monthly rental
rate $800." Additional terms state that if the tenant moves out before
the end of the lease, the concessions will be forfeited. These rent-
concession forfeitures are in addition to other fees specified in the
lease, including a "reletting fee" of $500 that the landlord can claim
merely for making the effort at mitigation if tenant moves out early.
The lease further requires tenants' signatures at the end of the lease
and their initials at the bottom of each page of the lease.
Mary signs a Sunset lease for a twelve-month term. After ten
months, Mary's employer reassigns her to a job in another state and
she has no choice but to leave. Under the law in the state where
Sunset Villa is located, Mary owes the rent for the remaining two
months if Sunset is unable to relet during that time. Under this law,
Mary owes Sunset the remaining two months' rent of $1,600 plus a
reletting fee of $500, with a reimbursement owed to Mary if Sunset
can relet for any portion of the two months. Sunset is thus entitled to
demand $2,100 from Mary. Instead, Sunset's demand letter to Mary
seeks the remaining two months' rent at $1,000 each month, plus
$200 for each of the months Mary lived there, plus the $500 reletting
fee, for a total of $4,500. Put another way, Mary has breached and
now owes $1,000 rent each month, plus the $500 reletting fee, minus
a credit for the ten payments of $800 in discounted rent.
1. Reimposed Rent Concessions as Liquidated Damages
Sunset's reimposed higher rent fails up front because it cannot
satisfy the widely-used test for liquidated damages. Although the test
varies somewhat from state to state, the common principle is that
2007]
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liquidated damages must be a reasonable estimate of an actual loss
68that cannot be quantified. Sunset's actual loss can be quantified,
and the reimposed market rent is not part of that loss. Clause 5 states
that tenant "will pay $1,000 a month," modified by the language in
Clause 10 with the $200 monthly concession, "making the monthly
rent $800."
What is the rent-$1000 or $800? Keeping in mind that the
contract language alone does not determine this, 69 the most pertinent
point is that the tenant was paying $800 a month. The tenant was
attracted to this apartment with an expectation of paying $800 a
month, in spite of the language that the rent would be $1,000 a month
in the event of breach.70 Sunset's loss is the amount of rent the tenant
would have paid, plus actual bills such as utilities, plus various
liquidated fees for reletting and cleaning.71 If Mary had remained in
68 Stewart, 245 S.W.2d at 486.
69 Id.
70 Closely related and undeserving of separate enumeration is the argument
that the parties had an agreement. That is, however the lease's terms can be
characterized as rent or penalties, the contract is clear on the underlying point-
tenants agreed to pay an extra $2400 in the event of early termination of the twelve-
month lease. This conclusion is reached with no regard for law or history, but
many consumers apparently believe it. But as with other illegal aspects of
contractual agreements, courts ignore penalty clauses. The fact that the parties
have agreed is irrelevant. Had the parties not agreed, it would not be a contracted-
for penalty. If this argument had any validity, then courts and legislatures would
lack power to impose terms on contracting parties, or to declare public policy in
regard to contracts. The opposite is true, and that truth extends far outside the
single point of contract penalties. See e.g., Stewart, 245 S.W.2d at 486
("Regardless of which line of cases is followed, the courts will not be bound by the
language of the parties."). See generally 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, §§5.1-5.9
at 1-100.
71 Most of these contractually-specified damages are uncontroversial, though
they may be onerous to the breaching tenant. Other than the rent concession, the
other fees are assessments of actual loss to the landlord. Ordinary rent, utilities,
repair and clean-up are out-of-pocket losses to the lessor. The reletting fee is not
necessarily a measured out-of-pocket loss, but is a valid assessment of liquidated
damages. The costs of reletting the premises include advertising and the salaries of
employees who answer the phone and show the apartment. Large apartment
complexes with continual turnover will bear these costs in any event, merely to
promote full occupancy, and without regard to how many tenants left early. While
breaching tenants may increase the work for employees, they likely have little
impact on the advertising costs for large apartment complexes. Nevertheless, it is
fair to spread those costs to the tenants who leave early. The costs, of course, will
vary from breach to breach, and while $824 may seem high, it is an assessment of
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the apartment for the duration of the lease, Sunset would collect
twelve installments of $800 and no more, other than perhaps
incidental move-out fees. The $200 monthly rent concession, adding
up to $2,400 for the twelve-month lease term, is not a part of the
performance of this contract. The landlord collects that $2,400
concession only if the tenant breaches. When tenant moves out early,
the landlord's out-of-pocket loss of rent is measured from an $800
base. Whatever argument that can be made for the rent concession as
a damage provision, it is not a measure of any loss suffered by the
landlord.
This failure to pass the liquidated damages test does not end
Sunset's argument. Landlords and sellers have attempted to evade
the liquidated damages test with two related arguments-Mary has
agreed to pay the market rent if she breaches, and the discount is a
bonus rather than a penalty. Both arguments fail upon cursory
examination, as explained in the following subsections.
2. The Parties' Agreement-Market Value and List Prices
Sunset argues that Mary is obligated to pay $1,000 because
her signature on the lease acknowledged both that the apartment had
a market value of $1,000, and that she would pay it in the event of
breach. The lease did not otherwise define the term "market rent."
For economists, the terms "value" and "worth" are not precise terms
of art. Economics references, if they define these terms at all, do not
provide consistent meanings. 72 Instead, the terms are generic and
mean what the speaker wants them to mean in specific contexts.
With "value" and "worth" having no fixed meaning, what meaning
should be given a contract in which the parties agree that 1) the
market rent is $1,000 a month, 2) but the tenant will pay only $800 a
month, unless 3) the tenant breaches, in which case tenant will pay
$1,000 a month?
an actual cost to the lessor. As long as courts find it reasonable, it is appropriate
liquidated damages under Stewart, 245 S.W.2d at 486.
72 See generally THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS (David W.
Pearce., 4th ed. 1992) (hereinafter MIT DICTIONARY), passim; THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Peter Newman ed., Stockton Press 1998) passim;
WEST'S LAW AND COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY IN FIVE LANGUAGES (1985)
(hereinafter WEST'S LAW AND COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY), passim. Interestingly,
the West reference does provide definitions for "market value" and related terms.
The apparent reason for the more precise definition there is that "market value" is a
legal term. See [K-Z] WEST'S LAW AND COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY 726-27
(discussing definitions of "value").
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If seller believes a good is worth $1,000 but nobody buys it,
then the good is not worth $1,000. Alternatively, if a buyer believes
he should pay only $500 for a good but no seller will sell at that
price, then the buyer is wrong. Although both buyer and seller in this
example may validly claim that their disparate value settings are
accurate, those conclusions have little meaning outside their
subjective views. This approach to value often is called "intrinsic
value., 73  The more objective approach however, is "exchange
value," determined by what the good or service brings in the
marketplace. 74  Although data are unavailable to show which
meaning of value is more often used to measure damages, there will
likely be little argument that exchange value is appropriate for most
contract damages. Exchange value is determined when the buyer and
seller agree on a price. Of course, that value setting is true only for
that one buyer and seller. Aggregate value is determined by a
collection of transactions.
If we assume that the Sunset lease's reference to "market
rent" refers to the average rental amount for similar apartments in a
given geographic market, this raises an interesting question. Can we
believe that the landlord willingly rents an apartment to Mary for
$800 if it will readily rent for $1000? One argument is that the seller
has the option of selling (or renting) at a lower price and may do so
for reasons other than maximizing profit. Such motives may occur
with individual landlords renting single apartments, but are far less
likely in large apartment complexes managed by an agent rather than
the owner.
The not-interested-in-profits motive can also be tested by
measuring the frequency of rent concessions. How often does the
landlord grant one? No data are available on this, but it is significant
that the rent-concession language can be found on form leases
prepared by residential apartment associations. 75 If Mary's rent
concession is recited in a form agreement, as most large apartment
complexes use, it is highly unlikely that Sunset's concession is
73 See MIT DICTIONARY, supra note 72 at 446-47 (discussing definitions of
"value"); [K-Z] WEST'S LAW AND COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY supra note 72, at
726-27 (discussing definitions of "value").
74 See MIT Dictionary, supra note 72 at 446-47; See also [K-Z] WEST'S LAW
AND COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY supra note 72, at 726-27.
75 Leases containing form language for reimposable rent discounts are in the
author's possession. These leases may be available at various apartment-
association websites.
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limited to Mary or a few other tenants. If instead the rent concession
is made to many or most tenants, there are two plausible reasons:
puffery and penalties.
Rent concessions, like other discounts from "market pricen"
are good sales pitches-this apartment is worth $1,000 a month, and
if you move in this month, you'll pay only $800. A more familiar
example is the car dealer who advertises the "list price" as $20,000,
but sells the car for $16,000. In both cases the puffery is a legal
means of inducing the buyer on the promise that this apartment or car
is worth something more than the discounted price. But when the
discount is reimposed on the sale price as a result of buyer's breach,
resulting in a price that the seller would not have received with
routine performance, the discount puffery becomes an illegal penalty.
To the extent that landlords wish to argue market value,
reliable data is available. The market value of rental properties can
be determined at any given time with data from apartment rentals in a
defined area. That is not to say that rent-concession penalties can be
validated by market data. To the contrary, they remain penalties
because they do not reflect the landlord's actual losses. But if courts
or legislatures choose to view the rent concessions as bonuses rather
than penalties, the burden should rest on the landlord to prove market
value when seeking damages higher than the rent being paid by the
tenant.
3. The Bonus Theory
Another specious argument for reimposed discounts is the
bonus theory. It takes the form of the glass-half-empty/glass-half-full
paradigm. Upon analysis, however, the glass simply is empty.
Suppose that Mary contests the reimposed discount as a penalty.
Sunset argues that the rent concession is not a penalty at all, but
instead is a bonus. That is, the lease does not impose a penalty for
moving out early. Rather, it does the opposite by rewarding the
tenant who remains. Instead of a penalty for breach, the reimposed
discount is a bonus the tenant has lost.
Professor Avery Katz poses a similar problem to students in
his Contracts class. He first asks them whether one can guarantee
prompt performance from a building contractor by providing that late
performance will result in a 20 percent cut in the price. The students
correctly answer that such a penalty would be voidable if the party's
actual damages did not reasonably support the 20 percent claim.
Professor Katz then asks them about a 20 percent price cut, and a 20
percent bonus for on-time performance. He reports that students
2007]
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usually see that simply cutting the price and re-labeling the penalty as
a bonus cannot operate as an all-purpose method of evading the
penalty doctrine. Katz points out, however, that the question can be
more complicated because bonuses as such are legitimate and play
valid roles in contract law. He proposes that the distinction between
contract bonuses and penalties lies in their function, much as Judge
Posner distinguishes between penalties and valid liquidated
76damages. A true bonus, Katz says, rewards the performing party
beyond the contract's fixed consideration for routine performance.
This explanation-bonuses reward beyond the agreement's
fixed consideration--does not readily distinguish bonuses from
penalties. The distinction is especially difficult in ad hoc contracts
drawn from scratch, such as an artist's agreement to paint a portrait
or a builder's agreement to construct a unique home. It becomes
easier in open market consumer contracts. With the Sunset lease,
Mary's ordinary performance through the end of the lease term will
result in her paying Sunset $800 a month for twelve months. The
bonus is the lower monthly rent of $800, and the event triggering the
bonus is Mary remaining for the full term. If Mary performs her part
of the contract, no bonus awaits her. The lease calls for a changed
price only if Mary breaches.
The bonus/penalty distinction in Mary's lease can also be
made by comparing the lease's terms to similar agreements in a
broader market. In other words, if Sunset claims that the $200
concession is a bonus for an apartment renting for $1,000, what
would that apartment bring in a wider market sample? If the market
value is $1,000 as Sunset maintains, then the $200 concession is a
bonus for Mary. If the market value is $800, then Mary has not
received a bonus but instead faces a $200 penalty for breach.
76 See Lake River, 769 F.2d at 1289-93 (finding that a contract's liquated
damages clause acted as a penalty because it overcompensated Lake River).
77 Email and telephone interviews with Avery Katz, Vice Dean and Milton
Handler Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, in New York City, N.Y. (July
28, 2006). Professor Katz further explains that in using market value to distinguish
a bonus from a penalty, he would be careful to obtain objective measures outside
the parties' viewpoints. Thus, in Mary's case he would accept neither the lease's
$1000 "market rate" nor the parties' actual $800 transaction rate, but instead would
measure market value from a sufficiently large number of similar rentals where the
terms did not include the rent concession or other bonus/penalty provisions. Katz
points out that a problem occurs even with this objective measure if all sellers in a
given market recast their penalties as bonuses; there, he would use the parties'
actual transaction price to measure market value. Id.
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B. The No-Interest Pitch
"Have we got a deal for you-drive a brand new Dynasty XL
today, no payments or interest until NEXT YEAR!" On March 1,
2007, National Motors widely advertises an ostensibly limited-time
offer-qualified buyers may take immediate possession of the
popular Dynasty XL with no money down and no interest or
payments until January 1, 2008. The sales contract repeats these
terms and adds a clause stating that this discount will be forfeited if
the buyer breaches by not having made the first payment by the end
of the five-day grace period that runs on January 5, 2008. In other
words, if the buyer's first payment reaches the seller after January 5,
2007, the buyer forfeits the no-interest clause and must pay interest
from the date of possession.7
8
On March 3, 2007, John buys a Dynasty XL under this
agreement for a transaction price of $20,000, with no payments due
until January 1, 2008. John takes possession of the Dynasty XL
immediately and drives it daily through the following December
holiday season. National Motors mails the payment schedule to John
in October. In the rush of the holiday season, John overlooks the
payment due on January 1. He remembers the payment by January
10 and promptly submits it. In addition to the reimposed discount
clause, the financing agreement provides the standard clause for late
payments with a liquidated damages penalty of a $25 late fee. John
also submits the $25 fee with his late payment.
On January 15, 2008, John receives a new payment schedule
with a letter explaining that his late payment breached the financing
agreement and he has forfeited the interest waiver from March 3
through December 31, 2007. John now will have to pay eighteen
percent interestV9-not only through the duration of the financing
78 This example is consistent with form contracts in the author's possession,
including those for financing the purchase of furniture, electronic appliances,
jewelry, and other goods. This example blurs the line between the car's retailer and
its manufacturer. In new car sales financed by the manufacturer, the true seller is
often a franchised dealer distinct from the manufacturer. That distinction is not
important here because when the sale is complete, the buyer's obligation is entirely
to the lender, which is National Motors in this example.
79 The financing agreement on which this hypothetical is based calls for a 26%
interest rate following breach. This hypothetical uses the lower eighteen percent
rate to avoid readers' speculation that the higher rate might be illegal under usury
laws, which is not this article's point.
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term, but from the time he took possession of the Dynasty XL in July,
2006. Is this a penalty?
The answer lies in the no-interest sales pitch. When John
took possession in March, 2007, with no down payment and no
payments or interest due until January 1, 2008, National Motors had
an outlay, at a minimum, of its investment in the Dynasty XL.
Whether that expense was borne from National Motors's own funds
or from borrowed funds, that outlay had a cost. In an ordinary
transaction where the buyer pays interest, the seller or financing
company will profit by charging the buyer more than its own cost in
borrowing or advancing the money.
But in this example of nine months' possession with no
payment or interest, the seller is not only foregoing the profit on the
financing arrangement but is bearing the cost of providing the car for
nine months with no immediate return. The cost varies depending on
the accounting method, 80 and on whether National used its own funds
or borrowed money to underwrite John's nine-month no-cost
possession.8 1  No matter what the accounting method or whose
money was used, National has a cost in providing John with a car for
nine months with no payments.
In characterizing the reimposed discount as legal or illegal,
the manner in which National's cost is calculated is irrelevant.
Whatever the calculation, National clearly had a cost in giving John
possession of the car for nine months without payment. This cost
necessarily is absorbed in the transaction price of $20,000.82 In
agreeing to pay $20,000 beginning on January 1, 2008, John already
has paid National's cost in giving him the car for nine months with
no payments.
80 National's cost could be calculated either on the transaction price of
$20,000, based on the seller foregoing its account receivable for that nine months,
or on the lower estimate of National's own cost in manufacturing John's car.
81 If National used its own funds, then its cost is the interest that money would
have drawn in National's bank account. If National uses borrowed money to make
its deal with John, then the cost is what it paid for that borrowed money.
82 In this example, where the seller and financing company are the same, the
cost is borne by the seller. If the seller does not finance the sale, then either the
seller or the financing party must bear the cost of John's six-month no-payment
possession. Unless the finance company is lending money at no charge, the seller
bears the cost. Unless the seller intends to lose money on sales, the cost of the
financing agreement-the interest on the loan-is absorbed in the sales price, and
at a profit.
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National's no-interest sales pitch is inaccurate. There is
interest on the borrowed money, no matter how it is accounted for in
the sale. That interest is absorbed in the transaction, and the buyer
pays it. The no-interest pitch is nothing more than that. It is sales
pitch puffery. Because the interest cost of the deferred payment is
absorbed in the sales price, the buyer already is paying interest in the
original payment. Using the fallacious no-interest sales pitch to
impose an additional interest charge is nothing more than imposing a
penalty for breach.
C. Common Policies For Barring Reimposable Discounts
Sunset's rent concession and National's no-interest car sale
seemingly highlight different aspects of the reimposable discount. In
spite of apparent distinctions, the two examples are identical. Both
are specious attempts to give legal meaning to sales pitches. Sunset's
rent is not being discounted, it is simply meeting market demand.
The Dynasty XL is not interest free for nine months; John's
agreement to pay $20,000 covers National's cost in furnishing the
car. Any of the arguments that applied to one example can be applied
to the other, and the policies underlying them are the same.
The more-often-quoted policy is the Anglo-American notion
that damages for breach of contract are limited to the promisee's
actual loss, and the related injustice of the seller collecting more.83 A
related policy is the efficient breach, the idea contracting parties
should not be penalized where changed circumstances require
breach.84 Both policies apply to all contracts, including both
consumer and commercial. But a third policy stands out in consumer
contracts: sellers should not gain by inducing breach. Penalties by
definition increase the seller's profit. As a result, sellers have an
interest in making conditions ripe for breach. If it is true that
business and society will function better if contract compliance is
maximized, consumer penalties can have the opposite effect by
rewarding the seller for the buyers' breaches. That is, sellers make
more money from a breach than from routine performance.
Of course, the seller will not make more money if the buyer
does not pay. That is why the seller has an interest not in promoting
83 See supra note 64.
84 See supra notes 54 and accompanying text, discussing Lake River, 769 F.2d
at 1289. See also Katz, supra note 60, at 386-87; Goetz & Scott, supra note 60,
passim; Rea, supra note 60, passim.
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fundamental breaches, but in inducing minor breaches where the
buyer remains in possession of the product and continues to pay, but
pays at a higher price than originally contemplated. These payment
deferred and no-interest contracts are the breeding ground for that
illicit profit. Moreover, even in instances of fundamental breach
where the buyer has forfeited the apartment or car, the seller's
demand can be powerful in the hands of collection agencies and
credit reporting services. Although there are no demographic studies
describing the victims of contract penalties, the practice is best
targeted at middle-class consumers who wish to protect their credit.
This is not to argue that all instances of consumer price
discounts and deferred interest are inherent penalties. As so many
scholars and courts have pointed out, it all depends on the
circumstances. 85  On the other hand, Professor Farnsworth's
statement comes in handy here. "A provision that simply attempts to
add a sum to the injured party's actual damages is ordinarily an
obvious penalty. ' 86 Discounting a purported established price,
whether the adjective is "retail," "list," or "market," is a puffery
device perhaps as old as commerce itself. In spite of its specious
logic that the good or service is worth something other than what
buyer and seller agree to, the discount sales pitch is legal and time-
honored if limited to that role. But when the seller's enticement
becomes the buyer's obligation-when puffery becomes penalty-
Farnsworth's categorical statement is on point.
IV. Conclusion
Contracts with stipulated damage clauses perform valid
functions in fixing the value of actual but difficult-to-quantify losses.
The result is a greater likelihood of quick settlement, or if a trial is
necessary, greatly facilitated proof of damages. Stipulated damage
clauses not addressed to actual losses perform the invalid function of
compelling performance, and have been illegal in the Anglo-
American legal system for four centuries. Unfortunately, penalty
clauses take different shapes and forms and cannot be sufficiently
described to bar their use per se, but instead must be construed on a
85 See 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 12.18 at 305-08 (discussing the
"reasonable amount" requirement when dealing with liquidated damages). See also
Lake River, 769 F.2d at 1289-93 (finding that liquidated damages acted as a penalty
because it overcompensated the party enforcing it).
86 See 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 12.18 at 316.
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case by case basis.87 One indicator of illegality is a breach that brings
more profit than would routine performance, with the additional
profit not reasonably traceable to any loss suffered by the seller. A
stronger indicator is the suspect clause expressly inducing
performance rather than compensating the non-breaching party's loss.
Despite their illegality, penalty clauses appear regularly in
commercial litigation between sophisticated litigants. Consumers,
however, do not litigate penalty clauses nearly as often. Consumer
challenges, moreover, traditionally have focused on late fees or other
unreasonable liquidated damages for identified losses.
88
Reimposable discounts currently do not appear to be a major
consumer issue. In spite of the absence of case law, advertising and
the author's anecdotal review of various consumer contracts suggest
that reimposable discounts now are widespread. Ironically, the
unchallenged reimposable discount should be more easily detected
that the unreasonably high late fee. Late fees clearly are linked to the
seller's actual damage in such things as administrative costs and
advertising, while the reimposed discount is nothing more that an
alternative purchase price. But whether the reimposed discount is
easily detected or not, its effect on the economy, not to mention its
impact on individual consumers, will be significant.
Law reform is unnecessary. The rule barring contract
penalties is one of the oldest in the common law. It has been
consistently upheld, and has been codified into statutes. 89 Cases are
not litigated, however, because consumers do not appear to consult
attorneys. Reasons may include ignorance, embarrassment, and lack
of money. 90 Consumers who do seek legal advice may have an
87 See Lake River, 769 F.2d at 1290 (finding that a liquidated damages clause
actually acted as a penalty).
88 Reported case law for consumers challenging penalty clauses is small,
although a precise count is difficult because the cataloguing systems do not
necessarily group these clauses under one heading. Unreasonable late fees (which
do not qualify as reimposed discounts) provide some case law. E.g., Sun Ridge,
956 P.2d 876 (apartment late fees set aside as penalties); BMG Direct Mktg., Inc. v.
Peake, 178 S.W.3d 763 (Tex. 2005) (deciding against plaintiffs in a suit over late
fees for returns of compact discs ordered through a music club on grounds of
voluntary payment). No cases were found challenging reimposed discounts, in
spite of key-word and other searches in hard-bound digests, legal data bases,
consumer websites, and the internet generally.
89 See U.C.C. § 2-718 supra note 62.
90 The ignorance is not only an understandable unawareness of the penalty ban,
but a belief that the penalty is owed because the contract called for it.
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attorney who does not perceive this violation. Whatever the reason,
the resulting consumer debt load is unacceptable.
Unlike the typical liquidated damages provisions pointing to
administrative expenses or other actual-but-unquantifiable losses,
reimposable discounts are per se disincentives to breach. When
examined in this light, shorn of the rhetoric of contractual obligation,
reimposable discounts mimic the harsh ad terrorem provisions of
medieval contracts and leases. England began rejecting the practice
as it emerged from feudalism. We should not allow ignorance or
inaccessible legal help to bring it back.
Embarrassment flows from the breach of contract, even though some consumer
contracts may be designed to induce breach and the reimposable discount is added
incentive to ripen conditions for non-performance. Lack of money for attorney fees
is attributable both to most consumers' income and resources, and to the relatively
low dollar amount involved in consumer credit problems. Most penalty-clause
litigation involves commercial parties and an amount justifying the dispute.
Consumer penalties, on the other hand, often range from a few hundred to a few
thousand dollars. That loss, whatever its impact on the breaching consumer does
not seem to justify hiring an attorney or filing a claim. Of course, consumers who
find themselves as defendants could raise the penalty issue as a defense. But even
then consumers tend not to retain counsel and instead either agree to pay or simply
default.
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